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RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
Appellant John Nigro appeals the District Court’s decision denying his 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence.  We will affirm.
1
 
Factual & Procedural Background 
On November 1, 2004, the government obtained an arrest warrant for Nigro in 
connection with the burglary of a residence in Philadelphia on October 12, 2004.  On 
December 10, 2004, the police received information that Nigro was armed with a gun at a 
residence on Gladstone Street in Philadelphia.  Upon arriving at the residence, the police 
found Nigro curled up in the backyard, lying next to a green bag.  The police arrested him 
and discovered a loaded .38 caliber gun in the green bag. 
 In light of Nigro’s numerous prior felony convictions,2 a grand jury returned an 
indictment charging him with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1).
3
  Federal Defender Kai Scott was appointed to represent Nigro.  
Following the indictment, Nigro participated in an “off-the-record” proffer session, 
during which he admitted possessing the gun and explained how he obtained it.  The 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  We 
exercise appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 2253. 
 
2
 Nigro had twenty criminal history points, resulting from thirteen adult convictions, 
which included six burglary offenses, in addition to numerous juvenile convictions. 
 
3
 The Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), states, “[i]n the case 
of a person who violates section 922(g) . . . and has three previous convictions . . . for a 
violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both . . . such person shall be fined under this 
title and imprisoned not less than fifteen years . . . .”  Pursuant to §§ 924(e)(2)(B) and 
(e)(2)(B)(ii), a “violent felony” includes a “burglary,” which is punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. 
 3 
session ended without a plea agreement, as Nigro stated that “[he] didn’t want to tell on 
anybody.”  
Following the proffer session, Scott filed two motions on behalf of Nigro seeking 
to suppress the gun recovered at the time of arrest.  Due to a disagreement with Scott, 
Nigro withdrew the suppression motions and moved to dismiss Scott.  The District Court 
then appointed Mark Greenberg to represent Nigro, who then reinstated the suppression 
motions and moved for a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).  
After the Court initially denied the motion for a Franks hearing, Nigro filed a pro se 
motion requesting such a hearing; the Court held a hearing, after which it denied the 
Franks and suppression motions.  
Nigro proceeded to trial, where a jury found him guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1).  Initially, the Probation Office determined that his base offense level was 
twenty-four under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2).
4
  Subsequent to his conviction, but before 
sentencing, Nigro discovered and informed his trial counsel of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Shepard v. United States
5
; his counsel then successfully argued that the 
                                              
4
 This section applies where a defendant has two prior felony convictions for crimes of 
violence or a controlled substance offense.  If a defendant has only one prior felony 
conviction for a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense, the base offense 
level is twenty.  U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). 
 
5
 544 U.S. 13 (2005).  As mentioned, the ACCA’s fifteen year mandatory minimum 
sentence applies to a defendant who committed three previous violent felonies or serious 
drug offenses. (See supra, note 3).  In Taylor v. United States, the Supreme Court held 
that a burglary qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA if it is a “generic” burglary, 
defined as an “unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or 
structure, with intent to commit a crime.”  495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990).  In Shepard, the 
Court held that in order to prove that a defendant had committed previous generic 
 4 
offense level was twenty – as opposed to twenty-four – because the government could not 
provide the documentation permissible under Shepard to prove that Nigro’s burglary 
convictions were “crimes of violence,” as defined in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. 
In turn, the Probation Office concluded that Nigro did not qualify as an armed 
career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), and therefore was not subject to the mandatory 
fifteen year minimum sentence dictated by that statute.  The government agreed that 
Nigro’s base offense level was twenty, as prescribed by U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), and 
that his advisory guideline range was seventy to eighty-seven months.  Due to the 
seriousness of Nigro’s criminal record, the government moved for an upward departure 
under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, and defense counsel then recommended that the Court sentence 
Nigro to ninety-six months; the government did not object to this recommendation.  The 
District Court sentenced Nigro to a prison term of ninety-six months.   
Following his conviction and imposition of sentence, Nigro filed a pro se petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging, inter alia, that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel.  Specifically, he averred that his trial attorney 
had advised him that due to his criminal record, he would be subject to the ACCA’s 
fifteen year mandatory minimum sentence regardless of whether he proceeded to trial.  
Nigro argued that had his counsel properly advised him about the impact of Shepard on 
                                                                                                                                                  
burglaries, as opposed to non-generic burglaries, the prosecution could only rely on the 
“terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in 
which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or to some 
comparable judicial record of this information.”  544 U.S. at 26.  The government cannot 
rely on police reports or complaint applications as proof of the nature of the previous 
burglaries.  Id.   
 5 
his possible sentence, namely, that the government could not utilize his prior burglary 
convictions to qualify him as a violent felon under the ACCA, he would have pled guilty 
in order to receive a sentence reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
6
  In support of 
his testimony asserting that he would have pled guilty, Nigro highlighted that a plea deal 
would have led to a sentence that was twenty-one to twenty-seven months less than what 
he received.  
The District Court found that Nigro’s trial attorney’s performance was deficient in 
failing to advise Nigro of the ramifications of Shepard; however, the Court ruled that this 
deficiency did not prejudice Nigro, and this appeal followed.  We agree and will affirm 
the District Court’s order.   
Discussion 
We “exercise plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and apply 
a clearly erroneous standard to the court’s factual findings.”  United States v. Cepero, 224 
F.3d 256, 258 (3d Cir. 2000).  “If the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible 
in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even 
though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the 
evidence differently.  Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the 
factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”  Anderson v. City of 
                                              
6
 Specifically, the defendant testified: 
Q: If in fact you had known that the 15 years might not have been on the table 
that you were going to get a guideline sentence what would you have done? 
A: Pled guilty.  
(App’x at 429-30.)  The defendant also highlights that he had attended a proffer session 
as proof that he would have been willing to plead.  
 6 
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985).  Furthermore, “when a trial judge’s finding 
is based on his decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, each of 
whom has told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic 
evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can virtually never be clear error.”  
Id. at 575. 
In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “the defendant 
must show that counsel’s performance was deficient,” meaning “that counsel’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”  Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).  Additionally, “the defendant must show that 
[counsel’s] deficient performance prejudiced the defense.”  Id. at 687.  The defendant 
suffered prejudice if “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”  Id. at 694.   
Furthermore, this Court has held that “a defendant has the right to make a reasonably 
informed decision whether to accept a plea offer,” and that “[k]nowledge of the 
comparative sentence exposure between standing trial and accepting a plea offer will 
often be crucial to the decision whether to plead guilty.”  United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 
39, 43 (3d Cir. 1992).  
Here, the District Court held – and it is not contested – that Nigro’s trial counsel 
was deficient by not advising him about the implications of Shepard.  The issue presented 
is whether this deficiency prejudiced Nigro, that is, whether there is a reasonable 
probability that he would have pled guilty had he been advised about Shepard.   
 7 
In United States v. Booth, 432 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2005), we held that a 
defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a § 2255 petition to decide whether 
his attorney’s failure to instruct him that he could enter open guilty pleas was prejudicial, 
where the asserted failure and decision to proceed to trial potentially resulted in an 
additional imprisonment of nineteen to thirty months.    Id.  We found error in the district 
court’s decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the defendant 
would have pled guilty and received a more lenient sentence.  Id. at 545.
7
   
In contrast, the District Court here did hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the 
validity of Nigro’s habeas motion.  Specifically, the Court heard testimony from both 
Nigro and his trial counsel with regard to his willingness to plead, and found Nigro’s 
contentions not to be believable or credible.  The trial counsel’s testimony demonstrated 
that Nigro “hated cops” and that he was adamant the police lied when they obtained the 
arrest warrant.  These facts suggest that Nigro did not intend to plead, regardless of 
whether he was classified as an armed career criminal and subject to the mandatory 
minimum fifteen year sentence.  This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that trial 
counsel could not have guaranteed Nigro that he would not be subject to the ACCA’s 
mandatory minimum sentence, but rather only could have suggested that the government 
might have difficulty in proving that he should be subject to it.  
                                              
7
 Nigro relies on additional cases for the proposition that the disparity between sentences 
is sufficient evidence that he would not have gone to trial had he known that a less 
lengthy sentence was available.  See Day, 969 F.2d at 43 (“Knowledge of the 
comparative sentence exposure between standing trial and accepting a plea offer will 
often be crucial to the decision whether to plead guilty.”); United States v. Zelinsky, 689 
F.2d 435, 438 (3d Cir. 1982).  As the government notes, however, the relative disparity 
between potential sentences is not that apparent given Nigro’s extensive criminal record.  
 8 
Nigro argues that the proffer session is evidence of a willingness to plead. This is 
unpersuasive, however, given that at the time of the proffer session, Nigro mistakenly 
believed that his cooperation could lead to a sentence less than the mandatory fifteen year 
minimum.  (App’x at 428.)  Despite this belief that cooperation could reduce his sentence 
below the fifteen year minimum threshold, Nigro was nevertheless unwilling to continue 
the proffer session because he did not want to “tell on anybody.”  Accordingly, the 
District Court’s conclusion that Nigro would not have pled guilty had he known that the 
ACCA might not apply was not clearly erroneous. 
As a result, Nigro failed to demonstrate “a reasonable probability” that, but for his 
counsel’s error, he would have pled guilty. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court did not clearly err in crediting the 
testimony and we will affirm its order. 
